# DEFINING VICTORY IN THE AFTERMATH OF SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN: CONVINCING THE ENEMY TO ACCEPT DEFEAT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

Tomasz P. Garbarczyk, CPT, Polish Armed Forces

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2006

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="center">**Report Documentation Page**</td><td>*Form Approved*
OMB No. 0704-0188</td></tr>
</table>

Report Documentation Page		*Form Approved* *OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE **16 JUN 2006**	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Defining victory in the aftermath of successful campaign: convincing the enemy to accept defeat.**	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) **Tomasz Garbarczyk,**	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **US Army Command and General Staff College,1 Reynolds Ave.,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027-1352**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER **ATZL-SWD-GD**
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT **Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.**

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

In the present world it is not enough to defeat the enemy to have a victory. Many wars were fought in the twentieth century, but only a few of them brought real peace. Since World War II the winner is also responsible for not only defeating enemy, but also to provide an order and security in the conquered territory. It is crucial for global security and prosperity. Many factors influence this process of "nation building." It is important to know what is the most important for achievement of the success. Some people may say that acceptance of the defeat by the enemy is fundamental for this. Are they right? Desire to finding it out led to the primary research question: Is acceptance of the defeat by the enemy required to have a complete victory over the enemy? Answering this question requires an analysis of the impact of defeat on nations, what objectives the winner wants to achieve, which of these objectives require acceptance of defeat, and finally what kind of actions are used to force defeated nation to accept defeat. Changes which affected the present contemporary operation environment require from the winner less kinetic approach. Some examples of this may be found in historical examples, especially of the occupations of Japan and Germany.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**1**	**85**	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: CPT Tomasz P. Garbarczyk

Thesis Title: Defining Victory in the Aftermath of Successful Campaign: Convincing the Enemy to Accept Defeat

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Alexander M. Bielakowski, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Mr. Brian R. Voorhees, M.A.

_____, Member
Mr. Scott Porter, M.Ed.

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DEFINING VICTORY IN THE AFTERMATH OF SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN: CONVINCING THE ENEMY TO ACCEPT DEFEAT, by CPT Tomasz P. Garbarczyk, 85 pages.

In the present world it is not enough to defeat the enemy to have a victory. Many wars were fought in the twentieth century, but only a few of them brought real peace. Since World War II the winner is also responsible for not only defeating enemy, but also to provide an order and security in the conquered territory. It is crucial for global security and prosperity. Many factors influence this process of "nation building." It is important to know what is the most important for achievement of the success. Some people may say that acceptance of the defeat by the enemy is fundamental for this. Are they right? Desire to finding it out led to the primary research question: Is acceptance of the defeat by the enemy required to have a complete victory over the enemy? Answering this question requires an analysis of the impact of defeat on nations, what objectives the winner wants to achieve, which of these objectives require acceptance of defeat, and finally what kind of actions are used to force defeated nation to accept defeat. Changes which affected the present contemporary operation environment require from the winner less kinetic approach. Some examples of this may be found in historical examples, especially of the occupations of Japan and Germany.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction and Background

The twentieth century was period of time which saw the biggest conflicts in the history of humankind. Some of the conflicts led to the other conflicts. Even Bosnia is still not stable enough to guarantee that the country will not fall apart again. It was almost like a "perpetual motion" utopian machine which did not need energy to run. However, some attempts which were made by civilized countries to stop these conflicts were successful. One of the best examples of this situation was Germany and Japan after World War II. It was the first time when the winner made an effort to rebuild a defeated country. This was the first time in modern history that this happened. Why were the winners so successful? It has never happened again.

Recent conflicts have not been solved as smoothly and efficiently as after World War II. That makes it very hard to define victory in these conflicts. Is it possible that the reason for this situation is nonacceptance of the defeat by the enemy? Was it the only or at least the main reason why Germany and Japan were rebuilt successfully? Those questions lead to the thesis primary research question. Is acceptance of defeat by the enemy required to have a complete victory over the enemy? The answer to this question could determine postwar actions towards a beaten country in order to turn an enemy into a future ally.

Some would ask what value is there in knowing if acceptance of the defeat is needed to achieve a complete victory in present understanding. In the author's opinion

1

this knowledge is a crucial thing for future operations. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is still ongoing, citizens of Iraq are the center of gravity. Which means the war objective is to gain their acceptance. Each side of the conflict tries to influence them and get them on their side. Of course it is not easy to determine that. Each country has its own unique characteristics and some things which work in one country can have an opposite reaction in another country. However, knowing those variables could have a negative impact on actions undertaken toward peace building would prevent future mistakes.

The purpose of this study is to research and find out if acceptance of defeat is essential for setting the conditions of victory. Victory in the modern world means something different from the past. Today, to achieve success it is not enough to destroy the enemy. As stated in the National Security Strategy, the process of democratization and freeing people is also important.[1] However, not everyone is willing to be democratized. Sometimes there is a need to educate people about what will happen in their homeland. Most likely, the people who are willing to accept their defeat are also more able to be influenced and shaped in the way the winner wants. Those who resist changes and feel unbeaten will oppose the invader for a long time. The best example for that is Poland during the more than one hundred years of partition. At the end of the eighteenth century Poland was divided and occupied by Germans, Russians, and Austrians. This situation lasted until the end of World War I. What was interesting through all this long period of time was that the nation resisted attempts of the occupants to change them. In the present world twenty years is a long time, one hundred seems like an eternity. No one will allow such an amount of time for completion of the task. That is

why it is so important to find out what makes a nation more cooperative and one of the main factors could be acceptance of defeat.

The problem is that in the present world it is not enough to defeat the enemy to have a victory. Many wars were fought in the twentieth century but only a few of them brought real peace. Since World War II the winner is also responsible for not only defeating the enemy but also for providing order and security in the conquered territory. It is crucial for global security and prosperity. Many factors influence this process of "nation building." It is important to know what is the most important for achieving success. Some people may say that acceptance of defeat by the enemy is fundamental for this. Are they correct?

<u>Research Question</u>

The primary question of this thesis is, whether acceptance of defeat by the enemy is required to have a complete victory over the enemy. The answer to this question itself is not easy. To reach a scientific outcome this study will examine what is defeat and how to define victory. These are the foundations for this research. Of course, these could be defined in one chapter not four or five, but the purpose of this study is to examine it more thoroughly. One of the main reasons to do this is that in present times these words have much different meanings than in the past.

Next, the study will examine if acceptance of the defeat is necessary to achieve its objectives by the winner. This part of the study makes the biggest challenge for the researcher to stay objective. First, objectives of the winner should be established. Then, they will be examined and assessed if it is feasible to accomplish them without acceptance of defeat.

Finally, this study will try to answer what makes the enemy less or more cooperative. In this part research will be focused on assessing influence of the size of defeat and intensity of the conflict. This study will try to determine if number of occupation forces and size of economical help matter and if so in what degree. It also will assess the insurgency process, as well as crime, demographics characteristics, and finally national will.

Stated below is an outline to help organize and visualize the linkage between secondary and tertiary questions.

1. How is defeat defined?

2. How is victory defined?

    a. What are the objectives of the winner?

    b. Can these objectives be reached without cooperation of the beaten country? (no, there is always point when the nation has to cooperate)

3. Is acceptance of defeat necessary to achieve the objectives of the winner?

    a. Is acceptance needed to achieve democratization?

    b. Is acceptance needed to change the enemy into the future ally?

    c. Is acceptance needed to improve the economic stability?

    d. Is acceptance needed to demilitarize the enemy?

4. What makes the enemy less or more cooperative?

    a. Is the degree of a defeat related to the acceptance of a defeat?

        (1) How can degree of defeat be defined?

    b. Is the intensity of conflict related to acceptance of defeat?

c. Does the number of occupant forces make a difference in acceptance of defeat?

d. Is economic assistance related to acceptance of defeat?

e. Is democratization helpful in accepting defeat?

f. How is the defeated nation influenced by crime?

   (1) Is crime an obstacle in convincing the enemy to accept defeat?

   (2) Is it necessary to reduce crime to make the enemy willing to cooperate?

g. How is the defeated nation influenced by demographics?

   (1) Which societies are easier to control and convince to accept defeat--diverse or homogenous?

   (2) Is level of education an important factor?

   (3) How is the defeated nation influenced by culture and history?

      a. Is it possible to use the culture to convince enemy to accept defeat?

   (4) How is the defeated nation influenced by religion?

h. How is the defeated nation influenced by "national will"?

   (1) Does "national will" exist?

   (2) What is "national will"?

All of the above questions have, in general, one objective, to determine if acceptance of defeat is necessary to achieve victory and what should be done to avoid resistance from the beaten nation.

<div align="center">Assumptions</div>

To complete this research, several assumptions must be made. First, and most important, is that convincing an enemy to accept defeat is possible. This assumption can be made and it is feasible. It was crucial for the relevancy of this thesis. The examples from the past showed that this is possible. Also, crucial for acceptance of defeat is a signing of the surrender treaty. In Iraq, "for instance, no attempt was made to arrange a formal surrender with one of the senior Iraqi officials who turned themselves in voluntarily, Saddam Hussein's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz."[2] This issue will be discussed more in another part of this thesis; however, from this quotation it can be assumed that there is something like an acceptance of defeat and one of the formal acts representing it is an act of surrender.

As stated previously it can be assumed that acceptance of defeat also has an influence in the peace and nation-building process. With certainty it can be said that when the enemy is cooperative, or at least not resistant, it is easier to influence a country and to shape it in a desired way. However, whether this stage is required to achieve these goals is unknown and hopefully this thesis will answer this question.

"Defeated populations can sometimes be more cooperative and malleable than anticipated."[3] This quotation did not answer the question if the acceptance of defeat is necessary to reach this level of cooperation. However, it shows some kind of connection between defeat and future cooperation. It can be assumed that acceptance of defeat is not

something that has only happened once in human history. It is a constant stage after war and it can be observed and defined.

The examples in this study will be based on Germany and Japan after World War II. Emperor Hirohito in 14 August 1945 stated "It is truly unbearable for the officers and soldiers of the Army and Navy to surrender their arms and to face the occupation of the country. . . . However, compared with the complete disappearance of Japan, even if only a few seeds survive, these would allow us to envisage recovery and a brighter future."[4] The ruler of Japan articulated something that was hardly possible to imagine before the war. He accepted defeat and tried to convince his own countrymen to do likewise. The German situation was both similar and different. Acceptance of defeat did not come from the top leadership. It was more a cause of the atrocities and toughness of the war which destroyed the country and the society to a great degree. Those past experiences might seem irrelevant for the future; however, that is not exactly correct. History may teach people a great lesson. Of course each case is different and the world is changing but still some equations remain similar. Finding these similarities would allow solving lots of present problems in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To undertake this research some things must be accepted. First, that relying on only two examples from the past and two from the present will be sufficient to achieve the relevant results. Time, distance, and other constraints do not allow this study to be broader.

Definitions of Terms

In this thesis several terms will be used which can be hard to understand or may be understood differently from the author. Some definitions will be provided to clarify

this. What is the intensity and the length of the conflict? They are related to the number of deaths and losses. From FM 3-90, "tactical victory occurs when the opposing enemy force can no longer prevent the friendly force from accomplishing its mission. That is the end goal of all military operations. Decisive tactical victory occurs when the enemy no longer has the means to oppose the friendly force. It also occurs when the enemy admits defeat and agrees to a negotiated end of hostilities. Historically, a rapid tactical victory results in fewer friendly casualties and reduced resource expenditures."[5] Intensity of the conflict is related to resources used in the conflict and casualties lost. High intensity conflict means more resources used, more killing happened, and more recovery time and resources needed after conflict. Length of the conflict in this thesis will be used in two ways, as a short-term and long-term conflict. The distinction between those two meanings is very vague, but in this thesis it will be understood from the perspective of the defeated nation. The difference between those terms is the stage when the majority of the society does not want to support war any longer.

Acceptance of defeat is a key phrase for this research. These kind of abstract terms are very hard to define. However, it is crucial for the success of this study to do it thoroughly and completely. Of course it will be defined in a way that the author of this thesis understands it. Briefly it could be defined as a condition under which a society is not going to resist the enemy. That is easy to say but more difficult to determine. In each society, even in Japan at the end of the World War II, there was a struggle between "doves" and "hawks"[6] as to whether the war should continue. However, the strength of the "hawks" was not sufficient to disturb the process significantly. Acceptance of the defeat is related not only to the society but also to the political and military leaders who

are able to influence the masses. Adolf Hitler said, "We will never capitulate, never. ...

We might be destroyed, perhaps; but we will drag a world with us--a world in flames."[7]

He was able to influence a majority of the Germans and drag them into war. Even though

they were losing and victory was impossible they were willing to die for their fuehrer. So,

to restate the definition, acceptance of the defeat is a condition under which a society and

key leaders are willing to cooperate with the occupant and stop the resistance against

him.

National will is strongly related with the previous definition. It is a morale

condition of the society. It describes cohesion and strength of the society. It is term

related to morale strength not physical. However, it may become a base for physical

power. Hans J. Morgenthau defines national will as "the degree of determination with

which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war."[8] Other

writers like John Spanier call it "popular dedication to the nation and support for its

policies, even when that support requires sacrifice."[9] "The more the nation's people

identify with the actions and objectives of their government, the more likely it is for

national will to be strong."[10] This shows how important national will is in a process of

defeat acceptance.

<div align="center">Limitations</div>

This study was conducted during the ten-month Command and General Staff

Officers Course, which caused a lot of time constrains. Having just about ten months to

do research, finish writing, and defending the thesis is a pretty demanding task. Time

management became crucial for success. This research was conducted mainly on

Saturdays and other time free from classes, because the main workload was done during

the Advanced Application Program. Limited time was the biggest constraint on this research and affected it more in than other issues.

Access to the information was in general not a problem. To conduct this research on a master's-degree level, resources available in the Combined Arms Research Library were more than enough. "The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) is a comprehensive military science research center supporting the Army Command and General Staff College."[11]

Since the objective of this research was analysis of the existing sources there was no need to conduct original research. It made the work a little easier. However, the sources needed to answer all the questions of the research was spread out in many sources so it was difficult to find, collect, and finally analyze them. The topic of this thesis, acceptance of defeat, is uncertain and very hard to define. It cannot be measured or quantified directly. It can only be justified by secondary effects. It is very difficult to say that one nation is more willing to cooperate than another because of acceptance of defeat. To narrow the topic enough to make this thesis feasible some limitations and delimitations were set.

The study will assess the feasibility and suitability of the acceptance of defeat for future use in solving conflicts. The topic of this thesis is very broad. For the purposes of this work it is necessary to establish boundaries for research. To answer the primary question, is the acceptance of the defeat necessary to achieve victory, research focused on the World War II examples of the Germany and Japan. Occupation of these countries turned out to be very successful and reached its objectives. However, while both cases

were different, some issues remained similar. Study of these historical examples will be supported by ongoing cases in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Significance of Study

The answer to question of whether acceptance of defeat by the enemy is necessary to achieve complete victory is important. It may have an impact on the conduct of present and future operations. It is also important, in case the answer to the question is "yes." How than does one convince the enemy to accept defeat. Lessons learned from the history may give some advice on this problem. For example, from the end of World War I winners learned that it is not the way to promote peace and development. "But by that time (World War II – authors insertion), the United States and England had learned the lesson. Starting with the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill laid down principles for a more prudent way to end the Second World War. The reward for the strategic foresight of these statesmen was, above all, the creation of stable democracies in Germany and Japan."[12] In the same way, lessons learned from World War II may be applied to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finding patterns and similarities between those examples will allow for the development of some foundations which can be useful and needed in nation building.

Summary and Conclusions

This study has one main objective, to answer the question of whether acceptance of the defeat by the enemy is necessary for success. It can be assumed that if an enemy accepted defeat he will be more cooperative and willing to support a new policy. There are examples from history which prove that. However, is it necessary to convince the

enemy? And if yes, what should be done to accomplish that? To answer these questions

and fulfill this research, some historical and present examples will be examined. Those

examples will be based on the occupation of Germany and Japan after the Second World

War and on the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. This narrow field of conducting

research was caused by the restrictions mentioned before. However, there are still a large

number of sources available for this study. The problem will probably be too many

sources, rather than too few. All sources will be examined in a detailed way in the next

chapter of this thesis.

---

[1]The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 1-4, 21-25; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html: Internet; accessed 12 December 2005.

[2]Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), XII.

[3]James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 20.

[4]Ikle, 84.

[5]Department of the Army, FM 3-90,*Tactics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-15.

[6]Ikle, 60-93.

[7]Ikle, 118.

[8]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 134.

[9]John Spanier, *Games Nations Play* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986), 177.

[10]Lawrence E. Key, *Maxwell Paper No. 5*, "Cultivating National Will" (Air War College: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1996), 4.

[11]Combined Arms Research Library (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CARL); available from http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl: Internet; accessed 12 November 2005.

[12]Ikle, XI.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

People for centuries tried to shape the world in their desired way. This sentence does not apply only to the development of technology and science but also to conduct wars. War was another way to conduct politics. This role of war was recognized a long time ago. Many authors wrote about it. One of the most famous was Carl von Clausevitz. He wrote that war is serving as a potent tool of policy of the country.[1]

According to the above quote it is obvious that war is just another mean to conduct politic. In present times there is no change. War is now a means to promote democracy and freedom. When there is no other way to enforce the western model of the world there is always the last means--war.

The purpose of this study is to find out if it is possible to convince the enemy to accept defeat. This is a crucial question for conducting future operations. Nowadays, to achieve success it is not enough to beat the enemy militarily. After the Second World War, one more objective was established, to change the defeated nation into a democratic ally. It is not an easy task. The better name for this would be a process. Some sources estimate that it takes at least five years. The more recent name for this is nation-building. This study examines if there is a correlation between acceptance of defeat and success in conducting nation-building operations.

At the beginning, this chapter describes general ideas about available literature and in the next part it discusses the best examples of nation-building. They were

occupations of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. Subchapter three focuses on how the writers researched this topic and what was important for them. Also, it addresses whether the methodology used in this study is similar to that used by other authors. The last part of this chapter is a summary and conclusion. This subchapter explains why this study is important and what new information it brings to the table.

<div align="center">Did It Happen?</div>

For this topic there is a lot of available literature. The base for this research will be books describing the occupation of the Germany and Japan such as *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* by Carl J. Friedrich. As it is stated in the preface, "A brief book such as this one cannot unfold the complete story of the unrealistic decisions made during the war in the field of military government, nor that of all the adaptations developed in the field to rectify the errors committed. But it can serve as a record and as a basis for objective examination of the more serious errors committed, from planning to execution."[2] The next valuable book is *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* by James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. This book shows the nation-building mission as it is written in the title from World War II to Iraq. It determines lessons learned from those conflicts and also shows implication, similarities, and differences of each situation. This book has one advantage over the first one mentioned before. This is the historical perspective. Of course, this perspective applies only to the World War II, but it has great value.

The third significant work is *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict* by G. Jones, Jeremy Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley. This book examines

different factors which are important for the nation-building process. It is done by comparison of actions undertaken in Iraq and recent military operations. By recent I mean post Cold War operations especially in the Iraq and Afghanistan.

The variety of books and articles in this area is large. That is the reason for setting a narrow parameter for the field I am going to research. Books written about actions taken fifty years ago are more objective. Research will focus on national will and the importance or maybe not of convincing the enemy to accept defeat.

"The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan were America's first experiences with the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation. Both were comprehensive efforts that aimed to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction. The success of this endeavors demonstrated that democracy was transferable; that societies could, under certain circumstances, be encouraged to transform themselves; and that major transformation could endure. The cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for postconflict nation-building that has not since been matched."[3] As is stated above, it is obvious that occupations of Japan and Germany were the best examples in the history of the nation-building process. There are couple of reasons why it happened. Writers point out different variables which may affect this effort. Some of them are prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and national homogeneity. Others can be culture, religion, national will and acceptance of defeat.

When the First World War ended, winners did not care about changing the defeated nations. Conditions of the peace treaty they proposed to the Germans were almost unacceptable. What is also important is that Germany did not feel defeated. The

nation and the army felt betrayed by the politicians. Economic suffering from the war, reparations and global recession could not sustain needs of the country. Those circumstances combined resulted in growing support for extremists. NSDAP, Nazi Party, came to power thanks to democratic elections; however, democracy was not going to stay in Germany under rule of this party. Adolf Hitler, leader of this organization, became the Fuehrer and led Germany into the Second World War. When the war was finished, the Allies were prepared to deal with the defeated nations. "Having sown the wind of vengefulness, the victors of 1918 reaped the whirlwind twenty years later. But by that time, the United States and England had learned the lesson. Starting with the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill laid down principles for the strategic foresight of these statesmen was, above all, the creation of stable democracies in Germany and Japan. In addition, in 1941 the United States, Great Britain and their allies agreed on new economic institutions (such as the World Bank) that helped rebuild the global economy and undergirded the Marshall Plan."[4]

Through assessment of the occupation of Germany and Japan, Fred Charles Ikle realized a few principles which make the enemy willing to accept its defeat.
The first and most significant fact was an act of surrender. Signing this kind of treaty, with honors and respect by trusted people, who have real power and support of their own citizens, had several meanings. One of them was an act of law. Signed by people who have authority to do that puts some responsibilities to those who are subordinate to them. But the other meaning was even more important. It was a psychological meaning. It had a direct message to the nation, "we are weak and unable to fight, so we must accept the defeat." Emperor Hirohito, when he addressed to his nation, talked about "enduring the

17

unendurable." It proves how hard it is for the nation and how much it affects its morale. The other meaning, also very important, is that it gives acceptable possibilities. It gives hope for the better future after the end of the war. It is obvious that not everyone will accept unconditional surrender. Those groups, which thanks to war came to power, will resist and oppose it. Winston Churchill stated "I must make one admission, and any admission is formidable. The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dug-out. That is a blank."[5] Adolf Hitler's words he said close to the end of World War II seemed to prove Winston Churchill's thesis "We will never capitulate, never. . . . We might be destroyed, perhaps; but we will drag a world with us – a world in flames."[6] But, for those who did not have a chance to advance, it creates a chance to change the past social order. However, it must be combined with certain actions conducted by a winner.

Another important principle is the prestige of the winner's forces. "To pacify a conquered country, the victor's prestige and dignity is absolutely critical. General Douglas MacArthur knew this."[7] People have to be sure that occupying forces are powerful and ready to punish and stop any resistance or disorder. In the countries destroyed by conflicts, occupying military force is the first police. They also have a responsibility to act responsibly without harassing the civil population. After the capitulation of the 3rd Reich, the 1st Polish Armoured Division received its own occupation district. It was the only Polish unit which was assigned that task. Polish forces occupied part of northwest Germany. The natives were afraid of the Poles. They assumed that winners would try to take revenge for the Nazi crimes against Poland. In fact Polish

soldiers, besides a few incidents, behaved very properly. They tried to act as a proud winner. German used the word "korrekt" to explain the way of this behavior.[8]

James Dobbins and others in *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* are focused more on the measurable variables. To compare different cases and examples of the nation-building process they use: military presence, police presence, total external assistance in constant 2001 dollars, per capita external assistance in constant 2001 dollars, external assistance as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), postconflict combat deaths, timing of elections, changes in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) over time and changes in per capita over time.[9]

A comparison of these variables led them to some interesting results. First, "Many factors influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building: prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and national homogeneity. However, among the controllable factors, the most important determinant seems to be the level of effort – measured in time, manpower and money."[10] It seems to be obvious that success depends on how much one can afford to put effort into the project. However, in the most successful historical examples of Germany and Japan this effort was very different. In Germany the Allies initially used about one hundred soldiers per thousand inhabitants.[11] In Japan it was about twenty times less. Of course, the number of forces committed to the occupation of Germany dropped fast, but still it was significant number of troops. The number of troops used in the operation is strongly related to the risk of the operation. "The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted. Indeed, most adequately manned postconflict operations suffered no casualties whatsoever."[12] Security is the base to build a stable country. Physical threat

can undermine any effort to build economic strength and democratic structures in the country. The best example of this is Afghanistan where government is limited to Kabul area because of a lack of forces to provide security in the broader area.

The other issue discussed is the command relationship during nation-building. In general there are two ways of doing that. The first way is a unified command. An example of this was in Japan. General MacArthur was in charge during this mission. According to a letter from Truman, General had untied hands and could proceed in an almost undisturbed way, "Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any questions on the part of the Japanese as to its scope."[13] This concentration of power in one set of hands made it possible to make sound economic decisions which could create the fundamentals of future economic growth. However, it also proved important to create short term economic goals. People needed to see some improvement of the situation right now, not in the uncertain future. In Japan all changes and administrative work was done by their own governmental institutions. Because of lack of translators and specialists, US had to rely on Japanese. This situation was beneficial, but also had some dangers. "Delegating implementation of economic policy decisions to local governing elites, with their own priorities, can significantly dilute the effectiveness of the changes."[14] The occupation of Japan had some valuable lessons for future operations. The most important was that "democracy can be transferred to non-Western societies."[15] The success of this proved that democratic values are universal and can be shared among all cultures and countries. It is not a monopoly of Western culture, but it can be useful and beneficial to others.

In Germany, the situation was different. The number of occupants made the decision making process much more complicated than it was in Japan. One of the most valuable lessons learned during this operation was that "defeated populations can sometimes be more cooperative and malleable than anticipated."[16] This lesson is very important for this study. It shows that there is a connection between acceptance of defeat and success in nation building. The occupation of Germany also proved the importance of war crime accountability. The international tribunal in Nuremberg and subsequent process of denazification proved its value. This was an issue which was unsuccessful in Japan. And some unsolved problems from that time can significantly influence present politics and relationships between nations.

"Permitting more than one power to determine economic policy can significantly delay economic recovery."[17] That was one of the reasons to introduce the deutschmark instead of reichsmark. The Russians did not care about the strength of German currency. They had different objectives to accomplish. That is why the Western Powers were forced to change the currency in their part of Germany. Economic recovery was also related to paying reparations. Reparations paid just after the war had not been successful. They only made recovery and stabilization of the country more and more difficult. It was experienced after the World War I. The example of the occupation in Germany shows that it is better to wait with reparations until the time when the economy of the defeated country will be strong enough to sustain these inconveniences. Otherwise, it will lead to instability and may very strongly disturb the nation-building process and the acceptance of defeat.

<u>Ways Other Writers Have Studied the Problem</u>

The acceptance of defeat was not a specific problem for study. It was always related to nation building and successful occupancy processes. This problem is more related to sociology and psychology. And those sciences are relatively new; this is one of the reasons for the lack of primary sources about this problem. Most of the authors mentioned in this study are more concentrated on the occupancies themselves. There are three authors who should be mentioned in this subchapter and have different ways of assessing and analyzing information.

Carl J. Friedrich in his book *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* presents different opinions to "explore interrelation between our domestic and foreign policy, our peacetime military doctrine, and the methods pursued in personnel selection and training."[18] The book consists of four parts. For the purpose of this study only two are relevant. The first one presents "certain broad general aspects of military government experience, and an over-all picture of Axis occupation practices is given for purposes of contrast and comparison."[19] The next part is a description of the occupation of Germany. The importance of this book is great because the text written there is submitted by "man who, though scholars in peacetime or civilian administrators, were participants in the activities they have recorded."[20] So, many of the facts are told by the people who actually had seen and witnessed things which they wrote about.

James Dobbins in *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* examined the problem from a different perspective. In this study, the way his research was conducted has already been mentioned. However, to address it more specifically some facts will be repeated. The goal was to research things which can be measured.

These variables were divided into two categories: inputs and outputs. On the inputs side were: military presence, police presence, total external assistance in constant 2001 dollars, per capita external assistance in constant 2001 dollars, external assistance as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). On the outputs side were: postconflict combat deaths, timing of elections, changes in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) over time, changes in per capita over time.[21] Analysis of these factors helped to justify and clarify what is needed to achieve specific goals. The way this research was done is very useful for this study. Analysis of the factors mentioned above in comparison with different situations can create other conclusions which will be more related to the topic of this study.

<u>Summary and Conclusions</u>

On the occupation and nation-building processes many books were written and a lot of research was conducted. A number of the tasks and procedures which happened during occupation are subjects of multiple studies. However, not too many authors tried to assess such important problems like the acceptance of defeat. One of the reasons can be that this is very difficult to research. It is hard to measure. But, there are some factors by which this acceptance can be recognized. Some of these factors are part of the research conducted by different authors. The purpose of this study is to find out if a defeated nation is a key player in the postwar transformation or not. If the answer is yes, it may change the future approach to the nation-building process.

---

[1]Carl von Clausevitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605-10.

[2]Carl J. Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), VII.

[3]James Dobbins, John G McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), XIII.

[4]Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), IX.

[5]Ikle, 118.

[6]Ibid., 118.

[7]Ibid., XIII.

[8]Rydel Jan, *"Polska okupacja" w północno-zachodnich Niemczech 1945-1948. Nieznany rozdział stosunków polsko-niemieckich* (Polish Occupation in Northwest Germany 1945-1948. Unknown Chapter of Polish-German Relations) (Kraków, Poland: Ksiegarnia Akademicka, 2000), 20-35.

[9] Dobbins, XV.

[10]Ibid., XXV.

[11]Ibid., XVII.

[12]Ibid., XXV.

[13]U.S. Department of State, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress*, Far Eastern Series 17, Pub 267 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 88-89.

[14]Dobbins, 51.

[15]Ibid., 51.

[16]Ibid., 20.

[17]Ibid., 20.

[18]Friedrich, VI.

[19]Ibid., VII.

[20]Ibid., VII.

[21]Dobbins, XV.

CHAPTER 3

THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Winning over the people is not a new concept of military operations. This idea was presented during the occupation of Iraq, but the same was accomplished after World War II. This study focuses on a subject strongly related to this issue. The purpose of this research, in broad terms, is to find out if it is possible influence a beaten nation. Influence means to shape the beaten country in a way which is desired by a victor. One of the main factors to accomplish this objective is the willingness of the enemy to accept defeat. This is the purpose of this study. To achieve this purpose, research, focused on answering secondary and tertiary questions.

This chapter gives an overview of the study. Initially, it presents the steps taken to obtain the information needed to address the questions stated in chapter 1. This part of the chapter focuses on how the questions were developed and what was the reason for presenting them. Next, criteria which were used to assess the outcome are described. Also, the suitability or relevance of the examples and the credibility of sources is assessed. The last part of this chapter consists of a summary and conclusion.

Collecting information

To answer the primary question, whether acceptance of defeat by the enemy is required to achieve victory, some secondary questions were presented. Because the subject of this study, the will of the people, is very hard to measure or quantify, there were a lot of problems in finding the right questions to ask. It is very important to ask the

right question in order to gather the necessary information. This information will be useful in assessing and defining the researched problem.

To establish some perspective, the definition of victory and defeat should be described in detail. Those definitions are essential for conducting this research. How do you define defeat? In this case, research focused on how to find out if the defeated society is changed. The main example for this research was Japan in the aftermath of World War II. Most information for analyzing how defeat affects a society came from studies and observation conducted by other authors. There was no specific research, other than using those sources, conducted.

Defining victory, which in conjunction with defining defeat, set the foundations for this research. In this case, research focused on addressing the objectives of the attacker, as well as the desired objectives for the winner to reach without cooperation of the defeated nation. Information obtained to answer this problem came from experiences of the occupants, mostly US Army and U.S. administration.

Next, research will focus on answering whether acceptance of defeat is necessary to achieve the objectives by the winner. The main source of information will be provided by historical cases, the occupations of Germany and Japan. Those cases will be compared with the present situation in Iraq. For the purpose of this study only a few of the many objectives will be examined. The most important are demilitarization, democratization, economic stability and transforming the defeated nation into a future ally. It is almost impossible to determine measurable criteria to examine all of those objectives. Therefore, the foundations of this research will be based on studies conducted by other researchers.

Of course, the purpose of those other studies was different, but the results can also be used in this study. Those results will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

The next issue addressed in this study, is probably the most important for the military operations. What makes an enemy more or less cooperative after being defeated? Historical examples are crucial in this part of the research. Those examples are restricted to only to a few incidents, mostly because of time constraints. In chapter 1 those constraints were discussed in more detail. This part of the research tries to address issues like: degree of defeat, intensity of the conflict, military and economic help, role of the democratization process, the reasons for the insurgency, what is the role of crime, demographics, national will, culture, history, and religion. Hopefully, the study conducted here will clarify what is the role of the above mentioned variables in making a defeated enemy more or less cooperative.

<u>Criteria</u>

To clarify the results, there must be some criteria to justify and to assess the answers received. However, in this study not everything is measurable. To find the answer for the definition of defeat and how defeat affects a society, the study will research changes in the culture of a defeated nation as well as changes in the organization of society. The significance of these changes is not easy to define. However, for these reason the most important to answer this will be opinion of the authorities. Researchers, who were studying particular cases, assessed the influence of defeat in a society.

In defining victory this study will be focused mostly on the objectives of the winner. It is very important to understand that. All post war activities should originate from the endstate the winner wants to reach. There are no specific criteria for answering

this question. Therefore, the research will try to answer whether those objectives were met because of the actions undertaken during the occupation. The criteria will be how the defeated nation is performing at least 20 years after the occupation ended.

To determine whether there is a possibility of meeting the victor's objectives without the acceptance of defeat by a defeated nation there will be no specifically designated criteria. An objective analysis of the historical examples will provide an outcome of this question. Of course, not having clear stated criteria is very dangerous for the study. It may lead to results which will please the researcher, rather than the real outcome. It is important to have this problem under consideration during the work and never forget to take an impartial approach to the problem. Each objective of the winner will be examined in order to find out how much the occupant relied on the help of the defeated nation and if the nation had to accept this objective. If the defeated nation's help was necessary and the objective was met it means that the nation accepted defeat and abandoned resistance.

It is easier to define the criteria necessary to answer the next question. Are these processes able to influence the enemy and make him to accept defeat? The next chapter will try to answer this question. Also, it will try to answer what makes the enemy more or less cooperative.

There are several criteria which will help to determine the final outcome. The first criteria, is the degree of the defeat and the intensity of the conflict. These are very subjective factors. However, to judge if the defeat was great in degree or not, this study will examine the conflict. The characteristics of the conflict, which this study will be interested in, are the number of casualties, level of collateral damage, and condition of

the armed forces. Degree of defeat is related to the intensity of the conflict. This study will focus on how the nation approached the conflict. Did all the country take part in the conflict, how violent was the conflict, and the length of the conflict, will be the main factors to assess.

Second, military cases will be assessed by number of troops deployed to the particular theater. A larger number of troops means greater security and protection for operations conducted by the winner to achieve his objectives. However, cases will be examined not only by the number of occupant troops, but also by the occupied country's ability to equip and maintain its own police and later military forces.

Third, the economic side will be examined. It is important to know how much economic help is related to post conflict acceptance of defeat. This help will be assessed for relative comparison in per capita 2001 US dollars. The study will then examine if the size of the economic help influences acceptance of the defeat.

Fourth, organizationally this study will focus on a democratization process. This will be defined by the time of the first free elections. The shorter the time from defeat to first democratic elections could be an indicator of how fast changes made by a winner influence a defeated society. Also very important issue is the rule of law, which is even more important than free elections. However, it is also more difficult to determine whether the rule of law exists. For this study the indicator of this will be a judiciary system established and an insignificant level of corruption.

Fifth, the emerging insurgency will be examined. More insurgency means less acceptance of defeat. This is another very subjective criterion. The insurgency will be assessed not only by its size, but also, by its power to influence internal politics.

The sixth issue is the crime factor. What the crime factor shows is an outcome of the security provided by the occupant and by internal police, if it exists. It also, shows if crime should be reduced prior to conducting follow on operations. It will be assessed by data gathered through occupation by occupant forces and by internal police.

The seventh issue is demographics. The structure of a society has an influence in the process of accepting defeat, but how it is decided upon for this study. Criteria used in this study are: ethnicity, education level, culture, and religion. The hypothesis for this study is that homogenous societies accept defeat easier than diverse societies.

Eighth, "national will" is very hard to categorize and measure. It will be defined by the strength of a society and it includes subjective factors. The study will examine whether this factor is related to acceptance of defeat and is it possible for the victor to use "national will" to its advantage.

Summary and Conclusion

This study examines specific historical cases to answer its primary question. The subject being researched is hard to measure and define. This is the reason why some criteria are so subjective and do not have a way to measure them. However, it is a risk which is justified in this kind of study. Using only measurable variables in this study could lead this research into a dead end. Relying only on quantified data could certainly make this research false. Of course, science requires measurable variables. Without them all research is just a guessing game. In this research measurable facts are the basis for the outcome. That which cannot be quantified will assist in the process of understanding how a nation accepts defeat. The next chapter will discuss details of the research which has been conducted and its scientific bases.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This is the core of this study. This and next chapter will give a clear answer to the question of whether acceptance of defeat is necessary to achieve complete victory over the enemy. This is the central purpose of the research. This study is interested in exploring if there are some patterns and common behaviors within occupied nations.

This chapter also tries to answer secondary questions regarding how defeat and victory can be defined and whether acceptance of defeat is necessary to achieve the objectives of the winner. The first part of this chapter restates the purpose of the study and then describes the organization of the chapter. The second part of this chapter answers the secondary questions mentioned before. Each question has its own part in this subchapter. Then the last part is a summary and conclusion.

Is acceptance of defeat by an enemy required to have a complete victory?

How Is Defeat Defined?

Each war has an end. For the opposing sides it is different ending. For one it is success, for the other failure. According to the dictionary definition, defeat means failure to achieve victory. It can also be defined as a coming to naught--the defeat of a lifelong dream. However, those definitions do not express the feelings of the defeated societies. The purpose of this question is to attempt to find out how a defeated nation is affected by failure. Answering that question gives a foundation for future research.

The reactions of defeated nations are different. It is hard to express them in a simple way. This research will be based on the example of the Japan surrender. This is how it is remembered by Aihara a Japanese woman, "The villagers had gathered around the single local radio over which the single state-run station was received. . . . Reception was poor. The emperor's voice was high pitched and his enunciation stilted. . . . Aihara was just exchanging puzzled glances with others in the crowd when a man who had recently arrived from bombed-out Tokyo spoke up – almost, she recalled, as if to himself – This means – he whispered – that Japan has lost."[1] How this surrender strongly affected Japanese nation is difficult to imagine. A proud nation, who aspired to become a great empire, fell into chaos. Before World War II, Japan was a strong country and its colonies were growing. When the war started they gained even more territories. Japanese society was militarized and thought it was better than other nations. Convinced that they were unbeatable, they started the war with USA. It was the beginning of the end for the Japanese Empire, since the enemy was stronger than the Japanese thought. After three years of fighting, suddenly the "weak enemy" was almost at the Japanese islands. This enemy also used a new powerful weapon – the atomic bomb. This, among the other factors, convinced the Japanese to accept defeat and to accept unconditional surrender.

One of the biggest concerns for the beaten nation was the question of how the victors were going to act, which was not easy to predict. As an internal police report said, "Many of those who speak of pillage and rape, unsettling people's minds, are returnees from the war front."[2] Those soldiers were assessing their enemies according to how they had behaved in the conquered territories. Defeat changed the culture of Japanese society.

32

The biggest changes were in the development of three different subcultures. First one was *panpan* prostitute, second was the black market, and third was "kasutori culture."

One of the biggest fears of the Japanese was about protecting their own women from the occupying forces. This issue was recognized at the top levels of the country. The government of Japan decided to organize *comfort facilities*. A small number of women were enlisted to protect the chastity of the majority of women in Japan. This public prostitution was stopped in January 1946. The official reason was protecting human rights, but the truth was venereal diseases. At the time when abolition took effect, "syphilis was detected 70 percent of the members of a single unit of the U.S. Eight Army."[3] This situation affected both sides. Japanese society had to accept and swallow this bitter pill. "Takami Jun recorded a conversation with a taxi driver who reported seeing a woman in a flashy kimono – like something from an operetta, he said – greeting an American soldier outside one of the comfort facilities. She leaped up, threw her arms around his neck, and said *Haro* – "Hello." It was for Japanese men, a depressing scene."[4] The winners, the occupation forces, started to change their view of the beaten nation; they were not the enemy any more. The former beasts who supposed to be killed and destroyed were transformed "into receptive exotics to be handled and enjoyed."[5]

The other new subculture was the black market. While prostitution was an alternative for women, "men became carriers for the black market."[6] There was a large economic value in the black market. Manufacturers who supported the war industry were now transformed to peaceful production. Overall there were not enough products to support the demands of the society. These big consumption needs made newly raising markets very profitable businesses. But these businesses were not adequately controlled

by government. This vacuum was exploited by gangs, who took control of the markets. One of the first was Shinjuku black market. In a very short time each big city had its own "blue-sky market." These markets were controlled by "*yakuza gumi* – gangster gangs headed by godfather – type individuals."[7] This was a kind of underworld which could not be controlled by either the government or the occupation forces. The words of Morimoto Mitsuji, a gangster who organized Umeda market in Osaka, showed the relations in the defeated country. "It was a time, when the strong ate the weak in the cold blood. I did what I could to prevent it, but it was a miserable time to be a Japanese."[8] Eighty percent of people involved in black market activities were former military or factory workers who lost their jobs.[9] The fight over control of those markets led to a lot of gun fights and wars between different gangs, and some of these wars were nationality based. The biggest change was in the mentality of the citizens. Black markets were a jungle. Nothing mattered there except money and strength. National solidarity of the race no longer had any value. The fundamentals of the society, which was able to build the only non-western empire in the twenty century, were shattered. Individual survival was the priority. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, in which is stated that people at first have to accomplish its basic needs like food, drink, etc., and than they can think about higher needs, was working quite well.

The defeat had more impact on the society than prostitution and the black market. It had also changed the culture. Old values and authorities did not matter. The lost war undermined values which were previously lived by. New times and new conditions needed new values. The shattered and disrupted society did not want to suffer and sacrifice for the country anymore. "The king was naked" – the military and values of the

Empire were stripped of their proud clothes. Some authors wrote that life was going back to normality. One of them Ango Sakaguchi wrote, "The look of the nation since defeat is one of pure and simple decadence." Former kamikaze pilots became the black market runners and widows started to look for other men. Of course, it is only generalization made by Japanese observer, who wrote, "Could we not say that the kamikaze hero was a mere illusion, and that human history begins from the point where he takes to black-marketeering? That the widow as devoted apostle is mere illusion, and that human history begins from the moment when the image of a new face enters her breast? And perhaps the emperor too is no more than illusion, and the emperor's true history begins from the point where he becomes an ordinary human."[10]

A number of colorful magazines arose during the postwar period. These magazines and art were known as a "*kasutori culture.*" The objective of these magazines and arts was to pleasure people not to educate. The common theme was sex. Before the defeat striptease was something unknown in Japan, but after the war it became common.

From the examples of Japanese postwar society it becomes obvious that defeat is more than simply losing. It affects all of society and it changes people entirely. This example was chosen for this study on purpose. Japanese society seemed to be almost untouchable and unchangeable. They were able to preserve their values and traditions for hundreds of years. However, defeat changed everything. The foundations on which the empire was built were shattered. Everything started over. Of course, the rich and unique culture of Japan was preserved, but after losing the war, this old culture evolved in a different and unexpected direction. Maybe it would be better to call it a revolution rather than an evolution. The bottom line is that defeat puts people in a position where they

have to give up their pride in order to survive. Similar changes have affected all defeated societies. "Thus, regardless of whether defeat ultimately undermines the leaders' and the regime's legitimacy, it invariably generates pressures for some type of reform. In many instances, the leadership's viability hinges on its ability to accurately detect these pressures and harness them accordingly."[11] In every example of total defeat there are the same patterns which show total disorder in the aftermath of conflict. It seems to be very important to fill this postwar gap with something that is valuable for the victors to influence the beaten nation. This leads to another question, how can you define victory?

How Is Victory Defined?

In this subchapter the author defines the objectives of conflicts victors. Defining victory allows further analysis of this topic. Research showed some main objectives which are achievable and are discussed later in this paper.

According to some authors there are two main views on the purposes of wars. One view says that every action conducted in the war serves the objectives defined by the government. In other words, the government has an overall plan and conducts war according to it. Another point of view says the opposite. In this case, the government has little to do with the policy of the country. Rather this policy is influenced and shaped by other players like various agencies, individuals, etc. These actions result in the government not having enough power to control the war. Someone else's objectives are met.

From the above it is clear that sometimes it is very hard to determine the objectives of war in clear way. Even during the war those objectives can be changed. In the ancient times defining victory was easier than it is now. "In Baghdad, that envisioned

3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace."[12] Since World War II people who were able to influence and change the world understood that winning the war was not enough. World War I was an example of an inadequate ending of a war. In shaping policy towards Germany after World War II, a lot of players were involved. The players were involved not only within each country, but also because of the Allied governments. Initially, all of the Allies were focused on winning the war. The main issue was who should be defeated first, Germany or Japan. The situation changed near the end of the war. "In this period the problems of winning the war began to come up against the problems of winning the peace, as the course of the war began to shape conditions of the peace."[13] Today, it is simple to define the objectives to be met to win the peace. It was not that easy in the post-World War II period. Even though, in 1945, it was vague and unclear, it seems that the Allies came to a consensus. Of course, the Soviet Union was not a part of this consensus. This study will focus on the Western powers and, in particular, on U.S. policy.

The initial objectives for the Allies were: demilitarization, deindustrialization and denazification. Democratization and changing Germany into the future ally came out later in the process of winning the peace. There were more important tasks to accomplish, and this study focuses on the most important. They were: demilitarization, economic stability, democratization process and changing enemy into future ally.

In the case of Germany, the process of denazification was also crucial. It was mostly the penalization of former Nazi activists and resettlement of the education process in order to prepare a new generation free of Nazism. Similar processes took place in

Japan. The penalization part was not as successful in Japan, but the educational change was strong enough.

The objective of demilitarization seems to be crucial for the future stability and security of the defeated nation. This process consisted of lots of different operations. The most important were disarming and demobilization. Control over weaponry was also very important. Possession of weapons was forbidden in the occupations of Japan and Germany. Getting rid of weapons from private owners was almost as important as disarming the surrendered military. It was also a way to control the population. Well planned, organized, and conducted demobilization was also important. After World War II no one wanted roving bands of armed former soldiers running around Europe. The western allies had a plan to conduct these operations. Operation ECLIPSE involved planning what would happen after the military victory. "The plan correctly predicted most of the tasks required of the units occupying defeated country. Within three months, those formations had disarmed and demobilized German armed forces."[14]

Separating people from weapons was not enough to stabilize the country. The next objective was economic stability. Examples from World War I showed that it was dangerous to leave a defeated country with an unstable economy. A situation like this in Germany caused the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the birth of the Third Reich. An unstable economy was like unbrushed teeth. Germs, in this example NSDAP, were multiplying. They attacked democracy and destroyed it, like germs would destroy the teeth. However, this concept of building a stable economy was not clear at the beginning. Carl J. Friedrich states that demilitarization, denazification, and deindustrialization were essential conditions to establishing democracy, and to eliminating militarism, fascism,

and the industrial war potential.[15] Destruction of industry was articulated mainly by

France, but this proved to be ineffective. There had to be something done with the

unemployed masses. They could either work or create unrest. The choice was simple; the

economy of Germany had to be rebuilt. The same policy also proved to be effective in

Japan. Actually, the best thing for the Japanese economy was the Korean War. The US

Army and UN forces needed supplies and Japan was close even to support the military's

needs. This boom in the economy strengthened the policy of building a stable democracy

in Japan.

Democratization was not an easy process. Germany, other than a short period of

time between the wars, had little experience with democracy. Japan had absolutely no

experience with democracy. Ruled for centuries by feudal shoguns, Japan changed to a

more modern type of government in the nineteenth century after the U.S. forced them to

open to trade. Even though they developed a bourgeois class, the Emperor was still

considered a God and the ultimate ruler of Japan. What was the reason for bringing

democracy into these countries? Maybe there would be more than enough just to change

the regime. This option had some advantages. It would be less costly and the goal would

be achieved in shorter time. However, it would not be a definite solution to the problems

which caused World War II. Democracy, despite being more difficult to implement, had

some obvious advantages. The most important was that democracy was a stable form of

government and democratic societies prefer diplomatic actions to war. The costs of the

war would be too high to be accepted by the nation. There was one problem if it was

possible to convert Germany and Japan to democracy by force. "In any absolute sense

those who insist that democracy cannot become firmly established, unless the Germans

want it, are certainly right. Therefore the situation must appear hopeless to those

Americans who have become convinced that most Germans were Nazi and that only 'a

handful' retained belief in democracy. To people holding such views the entire

occupation must seem absurd. . . . Once this situation is seen realistically, it becomes

clear that American policy is not 'imposing' democracy, but is imposing restraints upon

those elements of the German population who would prevent democracy from becoming

established."[16] This thought had its roots in the belief that each nation is willing to accept

democracy. According to this philosophy the most important was defining elements

which were against democracy and conversion or removal of them from the society if

they are not convertible. While that might be the true, in some countries not convertible

elements are harder to define and to restrain. One of the reasons is that they may have too

much power. This situation may happen if these elements are not totally defeated. In

Japan these elements were defeated and the Allies could proceed with nation-building

process. The Allies were able to impose such big changes, like land reforms and breaking

the monopoly of *zeibatsu*, the big corporations which controlled Japan's markets.

When the democratization process was implemented successfully, some

secondary effects took place. One secondary effect was the transformation of a former

foe into a future ally. This objective seemed to happen by accident. Of course, no one

wanted to create a future enemy, but speaking about Germany or Japan as future allies in

the postwar period would have been heresy. All the processes which occurred in occupied

Japan and Germany led to this goal without planning for it. It was crucial at the beginning

of the Cold War to have more allies and countries of influence than the Soviet Union.

To summarize, since World War II, there has been a trend to end the war when the peace is won. Currently, the end of regular military actions is not the end of war. As historical examples demonstrate, the end of a war does not equal peace. Peace must be won. This is final objective of the winner. To achieve peace, the winner must do certain things. These intermediate objectives led to the final objectives. The most important objectives have already been discussed: economic stability, demilitarization, and democratization. Achieving those objectives triggers another objective--changing a past foe into a future friend. The question is whether these objectives can be met without the acceptance of defeat by the losing nation.

Is Acceptance of Defeat Necessary to Achieve the Objectives of the Winner?

In this part of the thesis, the author explains why acceptance of defeat is needed to successfully introduce reforms by the victor. The author examines the four main objectives of the victors during the occupation of Germany and Japan trying to address this problem. The objectives are examined in this order: economic stability, demilitarization, democratization and changing enemy into future ally.

Economic stability could not be built if a country was unstable and insecure. Security and the rule of law were general foundations for economic progress and development in each country, not only in those which were occupied. Therefore, the occupier, before thinking about the economy, had to begin with the basics. These operations should be undertaken simultaneously, not sequentially. The reason for this approach, which can be also observed in Iraq, is that society cannot wait until their problems are resolved. They need resolution right away. "We found that if we concentrated solely on establishing a large security force and targeted counterinsurgent

combat operations--and only after that was accomplished, worked toward establishing a sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong government developing a free-market system--we would have waited too long."[17] This approach was not new. Maybe it was not articulated adequately and there was no theory behind it, but it was practiced during the occupation of Japan and Germany after World War II. In that case, the Allies used almost the same Lines of Operation used in Iraq: combat operations, training and employing occupied nation forces, restoration of essential services, economic pluralism and information operations.

Germany had many difficulties after World War II. All of Europe was destroyed and many nations faced similar problems, repairing war damages, provide housing and employment opportunities. Additionally, in Germany the Allies faced problems of reparations and deindustrialization forced mainly by France. Initially the Allies did not want to rebuild the German economy. Their objective was, to "meet the need of the occupying forces and to ensure the production and maintenance of goods and service required to prevent disease and unrest."[18] This limited objective did not last long. Only France was interested in limiting German economic capabilities. United Kingdom and United States of America supported economic progress in Germany, for two main reasons. "The US military government directed its energies to reviving German output as quickly as possible to provide sustenance to the German population, including refugees. Financial pressures soon came into play as well, since both Britain and United States wished to reduce the cost of feeding and clothing German population in their zones."[19] The military government of the occupation zones was responsible for economic recovery, since the German government did not exist. The German national bank was also under

allied supervision. In 1948 the central bank and currency were split between the western and eastern occupation zones. This happened because the Soviets did not want to follow the same objectives as the West. They did not want to build an independent and strong country. The Soviet objectives were quite the opposite. However the German nation was beaten and they accepted their state. Nation who suffered the atrocities of the war had nothing left. The main problem was to stay alive. Food, drink and other basic needs became scarcity. People did not think about resistance but about basic values from the bottom of the Maslow's hierarchy of needs. In 1946, mines and manufacturing plants were reopened. Even though the situation was improving, progress was slower than needed. In 1946, Germany reached just 45 percent its economic status from 1937.[20]

A similar situation existed in Japan, and much needed reforms were undertaken by General Douglas MacArthur. Initially, the American objective was to decentralize the economy of Japan. Prior to the war the economy was controlled by big conglomerates called *zeibatsu*. War made their control even stronger. By the end of war, the top ten *zeibatsu* controlled "49 percent of capital invested in mining, machinery, shipbuilding, and chemicals, 50 percent in banking, 60 percent in insurance, and 61 percent in shipping."[21] As a result of the "deconcentration law," a "list of 325 large firms designated for possible breakup under this law was finally made in public in February 1948, two and half years after surrender."[22] Meanwhile, the policy had changed, because of the Communist threat and the war in Korea. There was no time for the development of new model of the Japanese economy. As a result of this "reverse course" a number of firms from the list were dropped. The situation of uncertainty and confusion resulted in

the flourishing of many mid-sized companies, including Nikon, Canon, and Honda. Their method of success was fast change from war to peace production.

Initially, Japanese big business supported the Americans, because they seemed to be fellow capitalists, promoting a free economy. After they realized that the Americans were not going to let them preserve their economic power, it was too late for them to do anything. It would have been difficult to oppose the Americans even at the beginning. Japan was a beaten nation and had to accept the terms dictated by MacArthur's administration. MacArthur was conducting a revolution from the top. "Basic structures of authoritarian control were undermined in fundamental ways. Land reform all but eliminated exploitative landlordism and rural tenancy. . . . Labor reforms gave workers basic rights hitherto unknown."[23] Some constraints put on the nation were too harsh, and long term objectives did not work. The harsh economic situation and lack of basic products and food led to emerging power of the Japanese communists. This forced the U.S. administration to adjust its economic policy to fit the society. Overall, it seemed that defeated nations were able to accept worse conditions than societies which were freed after collapse of Soviet Union.

Demilitarization was another difficult issue to accomplish. A good definition of demilitarization is that it is the opposite of militarization. In post World War II Germany and Japan demilitarization meant not only disarming soldiers and removing industrial armament capabilities, but more importantly a change of ideology. Germany and Japan were strongly militaristic nations, and both were led by military people. Their leaders liked to wear uniforms and their ideology was built on the racial and military superiority. These beliefs were strengthening by initial successes in the war and by effective

44

propaganda. Those activities shaped the societies and proved to be very effective. A great number of the people in Japan and Germany were willing to sacrifice themselves for the country. An example on the German side was Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) division which consisted of young boys and proved its effectiveness as a combat unit in the Ardennes. On the Japanese side it was the *kamiakaze* or suicidal pilots.

All of these issues made demilitarization of those countries extremely difficult. The easiest part was disarming the remnants of the armies. In the case of the demilitarization of Japan, these remnants consisted of more than seven million soldiers. In Germany it was harder to convert war production into peace because of France and other politician influence. American Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. wanted to convert Germany into an agriculture nation without an industry.[24] In the end, the American plan was accomplished, but the hardest part was to change the minds of the people from war to peace. This was accomplished mainly by education and the denazification process. The key was to accomplish demilitarization properly and quickly. Delay in this process could result in having uncontrolled armed former soldiers, which would be a disaster for the nation's safety and security.

Democratization was the final goal of all the activities conducted by occupiers and it was the most difficult part of the process. In the case of Germany, even though the nation had some experience with democracy before the World War II, "it was unclear whether the German people would accept Western democratic principles more readily after 1945."[25] Even with some doubts, the Allies decided to build the future Germany on a democratic foundation. The final decision was made during the Potsdam Conference. This decision was made without considering the will of the people, because they had no

choice in the matter. Both nations had powerful individuals in charge during the war –

Hitler and Hirohito. Hitler was closer to population and gained his power through his

great charisma and ability to influence the population. Emperor Hirohito's power had its

roots in the historical traditions of Japan. The Japanese emperor was considered to be a

god, which gave him real power to influence the nation. The Japanese people were

strongly loyal to the emperor, and were willing to accept every decision from the

Imperial Palace. Ironically, Hirohito was the key to American success in rebuilding

Japan. The role of the Emperor in Japan was understood by all parties interested in the

transformation of Japan. "The charisma on the imperial institution was undeniably

awesome. Even the Communists stumbled, foundered, and made fools of themselves

when it came to the emperor."[26] If someone could influence the emperor, they could

influence the entire Japanese nation. The Japanese national psychology became a subject

of research even before the war started. Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers,

MacArthur's military secretary and the chief of psychological-warfare operations,

prepared, ten years before the war ended, a research study entitled "*The Psychology of the

Japanese Soldier*." In this paper, he predicted a future war with Japan and even suicidal

attacks by the Japanese military. Before the war ended, he added more information to his

analysis and developed new ideas. One of these ideas regarded the importance of the

emperor. "By mid-1944, Fellers had formulated a view of the role of the emperor in

language that would remain essentially unchanged thereafter. . . . MacArthur's command

believed that the emperor held the key not only to surrender but also to postwar

change."[27] The key was to separate the emperor from the militarists. This was

accomplished by showing the people that the war supporters or "hawks" betrayed the

emperor. They betrayed him by leading Japan to disaster and defeat. "Those who deceive the Emperor cannot exist in Japan."[28] This explains very well the policy which was undertaken by the occupiers. The Emperor was not touched by the postwar punishments. Some key Japanese pro-war leaders were prosecuted, but in comparison to Nuremberg trials, these trials were inadequate. Actually trying the emperor could bring more bad results than good. MacArthur concluded that no democratic court would sentence Hirohito for approving the war, because he had no clue what was going on in his country.[29] It would also undermine the emperor's influence over the Japanese nation. The better idea was to keep status quo and use the emperor to influence the nation. The objective was to implement democracy, and for that reason the U.S. administration needed the cooperation of the society. The first step was to accept the unacceptable--defeat--by the emperor and subsequently by the Japanese nation. The second step was to turn the emperor into a symbol of democracy. The emperor had to renounce his divinity to accomplish that. The new nation based on democracy, pacifism and rationalism could now be built. "The emperor's tours, which began in 1946 and eventually took him to every prefecture but Okinawa, placed him in unprecedented contact with his subjects. His modest civilian attire and habit of tipping his hat to the crowd (an unthinkable gesture before the defeat) became essential parts of his new persona as an erstwhile 'manifest deity' who had declared his humanity."[30] The policy practiced by the U.S. administration, that the emperor was central person to the transformation of Japan, seemed to work well. For this reason it would have been no good for occupiers if the emperor abdicated. Some have argued that abdication would have strengthened the communists within Japan.

All these activities were supported by information operations. All media was controlled by the occupiers. There were also several topics which were forbidden tin the media: criticism of occupiers, Third World War comments, militaristic propaganda, and glorification of feudal ideas. All of these helped to strengthen the acceptance of defeat within the nation and the acceptance of democracy.

So in Japan the emperor was the key to influencing the nation. He had to accept democracy and then democracy was accepted by the Japanese nation. The same thing happened with the acceptance of defeat. In Germany, the situation was different. The Third Reich was ruled by Adolf Hitler, who had ultimate power within the country. He was also the one who pushed Germany into the war. However, Germany had some past experience with democracy and was tied to European culture. At first sight it seemed that for these reasons there was no need for defeat to be accepted in order to implement democracy in Germany. Germany was not "occupied for purposes of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation."[31] The role of democracy in Germany was supposed to be similar to role of democracy in Japan. This political system guaranteed that both of these countries would remain peaceful and with no imperial ambitions. In Germany, the important role of implementing democracy required the process of denazification. This was crucial for changing the minds of the German population. The details of this process were not as important as its results. "The actual effect of denazification was an exchange of elites and only slightly altered property and socioeconomic relations."[32] It was most important to change the elites of the nation. In Japan, the Allies accomplished this in a similar way. The German nation was defeated and willing to accept every condition which was decided upon by the winning coalition. During the first year of occupation, the

so called, "Zero Hour or Stunde Null – the time the most conductive to change –
precisely because Germans had less autonomy and self-government, and Military
Government had more influence on German developments at this time."[33]

Within the German nation there was a desire for democracy. "As late as May
1945, U.S. intelligence reports stemming from POLAD, expressed amazement at the
number of anti-Nazi Germans who expected the Allies to assist them in rebuilding
Germany."[34] Some argued that maybe the Nazi system was supposed to be destroyed
from the bottom up, by a revolution. However, this idea was very dangerous, especially
in a time when Communism was spreading throughout Europe. That was why
denazification was conducted in the way it was.

The last objective of the U.S. administration was to convert past enemies into the
future allies, which was crucial in the Cold War Era. The Soviet Union was also a threat
to the existing governments of West Germany and Japan. This common enemy made this
ultimate goal easier to achieve. Japan, as well as Western Germany, was under U.S.
military protection. Staying on U.S. side during Korean War was also beneficial for
Japan, because this was a crucial time for economic development of the country. All of
these would not happen without the acceptance of defeat. It was a crucial factor for the
beaten nations. Ordinary people usually follow their leaders, so it was crucial for U.S. to
convince the leaders. This was accomplished in different ways. In Japan, they used the
existing establishment and in Germany the establishment was created from scratch.

The situation in Iraq is a little bit different. At first, the occupiers had to deal with
a non-homogeneous nation, which made things more difficult. In general Iraqi society
can be divided into three major entities: Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. There was no clear

definition of who was beaten and who was the winner of this war. Shiites, who were

supposed to be winners, were pressed by the Americans to accept the Sunni Arabs within

their government. The Sunni, who were supposed to be the losers, did not feel that way.

There was no surrender treaty signed by their representatives. The old regime was

removed, leaving a power vacuum. This vacuum was filled by elements hostile to the

occupiers. Also of importance is that Saddam Hussein does not seem to be defeated. He

is very confident during trial and hostile towards the occupiers. The policy of nation-

building overlooked one important thing, the Sunni Arabs are not beaten and it is hard to

determine if it is possible to buy them with U.S. dollars.

In conclusion, it seems obvious that to achieve the goals of the winner there needs

to be cooperation from the defeated nation. This cooperation is the key for successful

post war actions. To achieve that level of cooperation and to degrade resistance against

winners, the nation must accept its defeat. Without that, especially in a different culture

environment, it is very hard to accomplish the final objectives. There is no doubt that a

nation after a war must be changed and shaped according to the will of the winner. Those

who say that democracy will not work in Iraq are wrong. Democracy is a chance to

annihilate major differences between cultures, which may lead to future conflicts. This

change of the society is not easy, but that is why acceptance of defeat is so crucial.

---

[1]John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 34.

[2]Dower, 124.

[3]Ibid., 130.

[4]Ibid., 130.

[5]Ibid., 138.

[6]Ibid., 139.

[7]Ibid., 141.

[8]Ibid., 141.

[9]Ibid., 141.

[10]Ibid., 157.

[11]George J. Andreopoulos and Harold E. Selesky, *The Aftermath of Defeat* (Chelsea, Michigan: BookCrafters, Inc., 1994), 2.

[12]Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, US Army and Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis, "US Army, Winning the Peace the Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection*, 1 October 2005 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.army.mil/proffesionalwriting/volumes/volume3/october_2005/10_05_2pf.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2006, 1.

[13]Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 692.

[14]Conrad C. Crane, *Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won*, in Dr. Lt. Col. Brian M. De Toy, *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign* (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 10.

[15]Carl J. Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), 3.

[16]Friedrich, 13-14.

[17]Chiarelli, 1.

[18]James Dobbins, John G McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 17.

[19]Dobbins, 17.

[20]Ibid., 18.

[21]Dower, 530.

[22]Ibid., 533.

[23]Ibid., 244.

[24]Rebecca L. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996), 19-21.

[25]Dobbins, 6.

[26]Dower, 279.

[27]Ibid., 281.

[28]Ibid., 282.

[29]Ibid., 297.

[30]Ibid., 333.

[31]Boehling, 31.

[32]Ibid., 57.

[33]Ibid., 7.

[34]Ibid., 73.

CHAPTER 5

CONVINCING THE ENEMY

<u>Introduction</u>

Today it is hard to imagine a Total War like World War II. Nowadays conflicts

seem to be much more decisive and shorter, at least those conflicts which involve United

States of America. These wars or operations take a much shorter time than World War II.

That may mean that societies will be less damaged from hostilities and they will be more

reluctant to accept defeat. This is the main reason why convincing the enemy to accept its

defeat became so important. To accomplish that demanding task one should know what

makes the enemy less or more cooperative and what are the ways one can influence a

defeated nation.

This chapter is organized into seven subchapters. Each subchapter answers one

tertiary question which follows to answer the question articulated in chapter 5's title. The

Chapter ends with a summary and a conclusion which answers the mentioned above

question and leads to chapter 6.

<u>Is the Degree of a Defeat Related to the Acceptance of a Defeat?</u>

The degree of defeat is hard to measure. However, from the study of different

conflicts, defeat can be divided between total or decisive defeat. The main difference

between a total and a decisive defeat is the amount of collateral damage. The second

important factor is time. The longer the conflict the more it affected societies. According

to Field Manual 3-0, decisive victory "occurs when the enemy no longer has the means to

oppose the friendly force. It also occurs when the enemy admits defeat and agrees to a

negotiated end of hostilities. Historically, a rapid tactical victory results in fewer friendly casualties and reduced resource expenditures."[1] This definition shows the important factors when it comes to defeat. These factors are: intensity of the conflict, collateral damage, and, the most important, the length of the conflict.

Is it possible that the intensity of a conflict may be helpful in the acceptance of defeat by the defeated nation? World War II was a very intensive conflict and all nations were involved in the war fully. The war took place not only on the battlefields, but also affected the civil societies. There were almost no significant pauses during the war, especially on the German and Japanese sides. For example, on the Eastern Front, when the German offensive ended, they had to defend against the Soviet counteroffensive. This intensity of operations influenced the whole society; because industry produced only war material. Most civilian products were unavailable. Even in the United States of America, the economy had to adjust. The intensity of World War II was very high, but also decisive victories were and still are high-intensity conflicts, which was one of the main reasons for their success. Operation Iraqi Freedom did not last as long. The ground combat fight was intensive and lethal. All operations conducted in Germany, Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan were very intensive, but the outcome was different. Germany and Japan accepted defeat while in Iraq and Afghanistan resistance still exists. Therefore, there must be another factor which influences a nation.

What about the length of the conflict as the factor? The intensity of a conflict in conjunction with prolonged time can affect a defeated nation. Japan fought against the America for almost four years, Germany about the same amount time. Propaganda and powerful leadership were able to control the nations and the German and Japanese people

54

generally supported the war effort. However, the effects of the war for the extensive time had undesired effects. Ambassador William Sebald described the Japanese people thusly: "The Japanese people shocked me the most. They were, unmistakenly, a beaten people, momentarily despairing and hopeless. I saw a degeneration of humbled pride. Men and women, who once had preserved the appearance of neatness as a matter of honor, were slovenly, often dirty, mostly ill-dressed."[2] There was a high probability that if those countries had been successful in the war their societies would have been happy and loyal. Actually, even after losing the war they were still loyal. In Japan, the emperor even preserved his authority. In Germany, the situation was slightly different, since the nation lost its leadership. The Germans were initially guided by occupiers until their political structures were rebuilt. The length of the conflict required the people to make sacrifices, but it still broke their morale and will to resist further.

The last significant factor in influencing a defeated nation was collateral damage. "Allied bombing campaigns had left an estimated nine million people, approximately 30 percent of the urban population, homeless; in Tokyo alone roughly 65 percent of the homes had been destroyed."[3] Germany suffered even more than mainland Japan, because Germany was a theater of land operations in additional to aerial bombings. The destruction caused the collapse of the German economy. Overall, the situation was worsened by hundreds of thousands of refugees expelled from Eastern Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania. This complex situation required extensive human assistance operations and also made the Germans more depend on occupiers help.

To summarize, the size of defeat helps the winner to convince the defeated nation to accept defeat. However, it seems that it was not the crucial issue. There are some

authors, for example Ralph Peters, who advocate that an enemy should feel defeated, but to achieve that smart weapons are useless as has been seen in Iraq. In his book *New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy* Peters tried to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein was not willing to surrender because the level of destruction and fire power used by US Army was not significant. This clean war did not achieve the desired psychological effect on the enemy. Peters used the World War II example as a basis for these ideas,[4] but World War II also gives examples that this example might not be true. Of course, collateral damage had a significant effect on the population, but these effects were shaped by the leadership of Germany and Japan. In both cases, the key to success was removing "hawks"--the pro-war leadership. In Afghanistan, the Soviets were able to destroy the country, but it was not enough to break the will of the people.

<u>Does the Number of Occupant Forces Make a Difference in Acceptance of Defeat?</u>

The next issue is the number of occupying forces. There were a lot of people, and still are, who argued that in Iraq the number of forces committed were insufficient to successfully occupy the country and establish security.

In the occupation of Germany was the example when a large force was used. In the initial stage of the occupation, there were more than 100 troops for every 1000 citizens.[5] There was a correlation between the number of troops deployed and the level of safety and order within the occupied zones. Of course, after demobilization of American forces the number of troops in Germany was down to about 10-20 for every 1000 citizens, but it was still a significant number. Even more important, however, those troops were trained to perform occupation missions. Due to disintegration of the government and the denazification process, the Allies had to use their forces instead of the police to

keep the order and safety in Germany. The transition from combat to military occupation took more than a year, during which the U.S. Constabulary was created. These troops were prepared to deal with nation-building operations and they also helped to decrease the overall number of units because they relied on quality rather than quantity.

The Japanese situation was slightly different. Overall, the number of troops was lower and varied from 5 to 10 for every 1000 inhabitants.[6] However, the Japanese national police force was not disbanded and from the beginning it was used to support the occupation process. This made the occupation easier, especially when the occupiers had to deal with a different culture, unfamiliar language and customs.

In both of these cases, Germany and Japan, the number of forces used was a key issue in establishing security in occupied areas. There is no definite rule regarding how many forces are enough to reach certain level of security, but the numbers do matter. In Afghanistan, the number of forces did not exceed 0.2 troops for every 1000 citizens,[7] which was too small to establish security and control within the country. In Iraq, the situation was much better. The number of allied troops committed to Iraq slightly exceeded 5 soldiers for every 1000 inhabitants. Even though it matches the minimal number of forces required to bring the security to a defeated nation, it was still insufficient, because the enemy did not accept defeat.

An occupation requires a different set of skills than war, so troops have to be prepared. At the beginning of the occupation, the size of the force is important. Especially, in the situation when the troops are still not trained for the mission. The decrease of occupation forces depends on many issues. The most important are the level of proficiency of the local police and army, as well as, the internal situation and support

of neighboring countries. Overall, the number of occupation forces is strongly related to acceptance of defeat. Some authors, like Fred Charles Ikle, stated that the lack of U.S. forces and their inability to secure the country after the initial success of Operation Iraqi Freedom caused the later insurgency and security problems. Ikle wrote, "A day or two later, when mobs of looters ran through the streets of Baghdad, these proud, all – powerful American forces looked on sheepishly and did nothing to kill this incipient uprising in the bud."[8]

Is Economic Assistance Related to Acceptance of Defeat?

The general rule in business is that if somebody wants to earn a lot, he must first invest a lot. The same rule applies to nation-building operations. At least this is the opinion of some researchers. However, an analysis of the occupation of Germany and Japan it is very hard to determine the importance of economic support. Both countries achieved a great level of economic success and prosperity, but it seems that their economic success was more a result of their own capability than outside assistance.

In postwar Germany, the Allies invested a little more than 200 US dollars for every German during the first two years after the war. In Japan, the amount of money was smaller, less than 100 US dollars for every Japanese.[9] It is very difficult to determine if there was any direct correlation between economic support and acceptance of defeat. The economic assistance was not much smaller than in western part, reparations were taken almost immediately, and the people were still forced to obey orders from occupiers. This economic help was so insignificant that it was not able to stop unrest among the population. In Japan the number of Communists started to grow. The Japanese also suffered from food shortages, but hunger in Japan was more a result of the prolonged war

than of defeat. In 1944, "officials in Osaka prefecture estimated that 46 percent of all economic crimes in their jurisdiction involved food."[10] In reality, defeat helped the Japanese to avoid starvation, but even foreign help did not solve that problem. "There were times the children screamed in hunger; times when all four family members shared 20 grams of roasted beans and tea for breakfast."[11] This hunger caused diseases and extensive deaths. The rate of death from tuberculosis was more than 100,000 per year until 1951, when the number dropped to less than 100,000.[12]

Economic growth in Japan and Germany also happened thanks to Soviets. Threat from Red Army convinced the United States of America and European countries that they need a strong West Germany on their side to support a future confrontation with the United States of Soviet Russia. Japan, as was discussed earlier, earned money during Korean War. Those events were not planned and no one estimated that Germany and Japan would emerge as the economic powers. As a comparison, Afghanistan received comparably more amount money than Japan,[13] but the country is still hard to control and there are places where resistance against the occupiers exists.

A final point which supports the idea that economic help has little influence on accepting defeat is a comparison between West and East Germany. The Soviets' economic involvement in rebuilding their occupation zone was much smaller than in West Germany, but they were still able to control the defeated nation successfully. This shows that money is not a key issue in influencing the enemy to accept defeat. It may be helpful but it is not decisive. There are some other factors, such as democratization, which might have a much greater impact on the acceptance of defeat.

Is Democratization Helpful in Accepting Defeat?

Democratization, as stated in the previous chapter, was very important in occupation of Germany and Japan. Some researchers believe that it was neither economic assistance nor the number of forces used during the occupation, "rather it is the level of effort the United States and the international community put into their democratic transformation."[14]

One of the primary objectives after the World War II was the democratization of Japan and Germany. Even though there were many opponents who argued that those countries are not able to be democratic and that democracy could not be implemented by force, the task was accomplished. Democratization was one of the crucial factors for accepting defeat. In Greek demos meant people and kratos meant rule, so this system was about rule by the people. In order for democracy to be successful, three things had to happen first, the removal of the previous leadership, who were unwilling to accept the changes, a change in information control, and finally the rule of law.

In Japan and Germany the removal of uncooperative or even hostile leaders was accomplished in different ways. In Germany this was done mainly through denazification. Of course, this process was conducted differently in each occupation zone. For the purpose of this research the focus will be only on US occupation zone. The Allies tried to determine who had connections with Nazi Party, which was accomplished by forcing adult Germans to fill a special questionnaire. They had to answer detailed questions about their involvement in the previous regime. Those who lied were severely punished.[15] This operation helped to divide people between the cooperative and the uncooperative. It was general knowledge that there were certain fields where the Allies

had to rely on former Nazis, especially in the professions where a specific level of knowledge and experience was required. "Although denazification was one of the principal objectives of the early occupation period, the proposed scale of denazification quickly proved impractical. The occupying powers did not have the manpower or resources to accomplish such a thorough purging of German society."[16] Even though denazification had its limits it proved to be effective in developing a new leadership within the country, a leadership which was effective in building a democracy. In Japan a similar process took place, but it was more limited than in Germany. The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, established seven categories of people who required an investigation. Those categories included the former military and people from former civilian establishment. The objective of this was similar to denazification to purge of uncooperative people. "Between May 1946 and April 1948 . . . 4200 Japanese officials were found guilty of war crimes, 700 of whom were executed, and an additional 186000 people were officially purged from their wartime positions. . . . The purge efficiently eliminated all spirit warrior influence in the post-conflict government and educational infrastructures."[17]

Information control was also crucial to prepare the occupied societies for democracy. To achieve goal of acceptance of defeat by the defeated nation, the occupiers had to control the media. This task was easier then than it is now in the information age. In Japan and Germany the policy was very similar. The Civil Censorship Detachment, which was operating in Japan, developed a long list of items prohibited in media. The list included criticism of the Allies, and glorification or justification of war criminals. "Sensitive social issues such as fraternization, prostitution involving the occupation

forces, or mixed-blood children, to say nothing of GI crimes including rape, could not be discussed."[18] This control over information in conjunction with the war-guilt campaign helped to shape the society in a way desired by occupiers. In Japan this information control helped to diminish the influence of the Communists and assisted in winning elections for conservative parties. In Germany democracy was built from bottom to top, while in Japan it was done in opposite direction. The first election in Japan was conducted in 1946, seven months after the war. Conservative parties retained their power and formed a cabinet.[19] In West Germany, the first nationwide elections were conducted in 1949. Prior to that election, the Allies tried to build democracy from the bottom. Local elections were conducted first. The main reason for that was that the Japanese leadership was still present and accepted defeat, while German leadership was unwilling to accept defeat and fought until the end.

The last major factor in convincing the enemy to accept defeat and also in establishing democracy was the rule of law. Rule of law was a fundamental factor which distinguishes democracy from other types of government. This gave people the feeling that everybody was equal. In countries like postwar Japan and Germany, the implementation of the rule of law was not an easy task. In Germany, most of the lawyers were Nazis,[20] which required extensive changes in the courts. This process of reforming the judicial system was very slow. The other important issue which was solved by good jurisprudence was the reduction of crime. Some authors argue that security and safety are prerequisites of the nation-building process.[21]

<u>How Is the Defeated Nation Influenced by Crime?</u>

"All societies in transition experience a rise in crime and an increase in violence as old security institutions are dismantled and new ones are built. Thus, an increase in violence and crime, especially in the initial period after reconstruction begins, does not by itself demonstrate that the mission is failing."[22] Order and security are essential to rebuild the nation and to convince the enemy to accept defeat. Societies which were worn out from hostilities needed peace to rebuild. Crime, which was a result of those hostilities, was the biggest obstacle to restoring order in the country.

In Germany, the United States Constabulary's main effort was fighting black marketeering. Black marketeering was a serious problem in the postwar Germany, as well as in other postwar countries. It was a source of crime and civil disorder. The United States Constabulary also had to deal with refugee camps. The camps were not only major targets for black market activities, but also a source of instability, crime, and riots.[23] To deal with that variety of unwanted behavior, the occupiers developed techniques to control the camps, most particularly search and seizure operations. "Such operations could benefit from eliminating black market activities and apprehending wanted suspects, but they could prove disastrous as well. For example, a raid on camp of DPs without adequate security or show of force could result in a deadly riot."[24] Also important was the soldier's behavior during the search operations. If it had been done in an arrogant way it could have affected the reputation of the Allied forces. These operations peaked in September 1946 with 19 operations in which more than 1600 troops participated and 348 violators were arrested.[25] The operations conducted by the United States Constabulary helped build a level of security and order in the West Germany. People were confident

that they were safe and that crime would be punished. This was crucial to developing democracy and convincing the population to accept defeat.

How Is the Defeated Nation Influenced by Demographics?

"China's Revolutionary War . . . is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore . . . it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand them, you will not be able to win."[26] This quotation shows that each environment is different, and even though there were some similarities between different occupations there were also certain differences. Most of these differences are based on demographic, cultural, historical and religious issues.

Japan and Germany after World War II were homogenous societies. Iraq and Afghanistan are much more diverse and tribalism divides them even more. Operations in this kind of environment are much more difficult than those conducted after World War II. Currently, the Iraqi population is 75 percent-80 percent Arab, 15 percent-20 percent Kurdish, 5 percent Turkoman, Assyrian or other.[27] At first glance this population looks pretty homogenous but, in reality, it is more complicated. The Arab population which is the majority is divided along tribal, family, and religious lines. This situation is very demanding for the occupation force. In postwar Germany and Japan, the Allies could predict behavior of the society, but it is very hard to accomplish that in Iraq. Even the problem of the acceptance of defeat is hard to determine. Who actually lost the war? It is very hard to determine and that is why it is difficult to convince them to accept defeat.

Culture and history are among other factors that play an important role in nation-building efforts. One of the lessons learned from research conducted under the direction

of James Dobbins was that "democracy can be transferred to the non-Western society."[28] So it seems that culture and history were not the main factors in changing a nation. The Japanese, it seemed, would not be able to accept surrender, since their militaristic culture allowed death as the only option. However, they were able to surrender unconditionally and it was not effect of the atomic bomb, but the leadership's change of mind that made that possible. However, culture had a significant impact on organizing Japanese life after the surrender. Germany and Japan were very structured societies. Order, commitment to the nation, and a general respect for leaders characterized both nations. Iraq and Afghanistan were the opposite. Prolonged resistance towards the government made those societies less cooperative with the government. This was one of the reasons why it is so hard to implement democracy in those countries. However, time may change everything. The first years of the occupation in Germany were not also very positive. "Never has American prestige in Europe been lower. . . . A great many feel that the cure has been worse than the disease. . . . The taste of victory had gone sour in the mouth of every thoughtful American I met."[29]

  Culture and tradition can not be separated from religion, which was an important factor in Japan and is important today as well. The divine emperor in Japan could do anything. His position in Japanese society was so strong that he could order them "to bear, the unbearable." The Allies understood this and used it to their own advantage. The first rule of occupation is to have religious leaders on own side because they are able to influence national will.

How Is the Defeated Nation Influenced by "National Will"?

It seems that when a nation is defeated "national will" is also broken. This was always one of the prerequisites of victory. The winner could not defeat an adversary without breaking his will. Therefore, "national will" was not something that was influencing the nation, but rather it was something that could be shaped and influenced. The main objective in the Japanese and Germany occupation was to keep this factor on the occupiers' side. This was accomplished by several activities. The most important, such as economic, military, and political were discussed previously, but there was one last item. This last item seems contradictory to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. He stated that people do not care for higher needs if the basic ones are not fulfilled. It might be truth if we examine leadership of the terrorist organizations. Their basic needs were fulfilled and they could focus on other things. And they were able to influence "national will" of the Iraqis, especially Sunni, when they were defeated. Through this influence they were able to get new volunteers, who did not care about basic needs because they wanted to fight for the "higher cause." These insurgency leaders were faster than the allies with influencing the nation. It gave them advantage at the beginning. Right now it seems that in Iraq enemy must be defeated one more time to convince him to accept defeat. The main question is who is the enemy?

Summary

There were certain policies enacted by the Allies, which allowed them to control and influence the populations in postwar Germany and Japan. For them to accept defeat, the most important ones were: implementation of democracy and providing of security. The other factors discussed in this chapter also matter and were able to help to influence

the defeated nations. However, there is only one prerequisite which must be fulfilled for success--the nation must be defeated. In Germany postwar casualties were very limited, but in Iraq today United States military casualties exceed two thousand troops and the number of Iraqi casualties is even higher. That means that the Iraq war is still going on and the enemy has not been defeated. If there is no defeat, it is hard to convince the nation to accept something that has not happened.

---

[1]Department of the Army, FM 3-90,*Tactics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-15.

[2]William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1965), 38.

[3]Lt. Col. David P. Cavaleri, "Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations," *Global War on Terrorism,* Occasional Paper 7 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press 2005), 21.

[4]Ralph Peters, *New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy* (New York, NY: Sentinel, 2005), 31-44, 84.

[5]James Dobbins, John G McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), XVII.

[6]Dobbins, XVII.

[7]Ibid., XVII.

[8]Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), XIII.

[9]Dobbins, XVIII.

[10]John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 90.

[11]Dower, 102.

[12]Ibid., 103.

[13]Dobbins, XIV.

[14]Ibid., XIX.

[15]Cavaleri, 10-11.

[16]Dobbins, 14.

[17]Cavaleri, 37.

[18]Dower, 412.

[19]Dobbins, 44.

[20]Cavaleri, 10.

[21]Seth G. Jones, *Establishing Law and Order after the Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), XI-XXII.

[22]Seth G. Jones, XIV.

[23]Kendall D. Gott, "Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953," *Global War on Terrorism,* Occasional Paper 11 (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press 2005), 19-21.

[24]Gott, 21.

[25]Ibid., 23.

[26]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung*. (Peking, PRC:Foreign Language Press, 1972) in *H200: Military Revolutions* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff Collage, 2005), 272.

[27]Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook* [database on-line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html; Internet; accessed 20 March 2006.

[28]Dobbins, 51.

[29]John D. Passos, "Americans Are Loosing the Victory in Europe," *Life Magazine*, 7 January 1946, 22-24 [article on-line]; available from http://www. jessicaswell.com /MT/archives/000872.html; Internet; accessed 20 March 2006.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this research was to find out if acceptance of defeat was essential

for setting the conditions for victory. The method of influencing a defeated nation and

whether it is possible seems to be crucial in the Contemporary Operation Environment.

Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of how sometimes non-kinetic options are much better

than traditional ones. Today it would be hard to imagine carpet bombings and

annihilation of entire nations, since world opinion would not accept it.

Interpretation of Chapter 4 Findings

In chapter 4, the author tried to answer the question of whether acceptance of

defeat is required to achieve complete victory. The author had to first define defeat. After

studying the defeat of Japan after World War II it seemed pretty obvious that defeat

changed that entire society. Defeat shook the foundations of the society and created

conditions for future changes. The impact of defeat was so extensive that even the

national culture which was very resistant to change was affected. In a situation like this, it

was possible for the winner to influence the defeated society and to even change the

culture according to its will.

Studying what conditions were required to achieve victory showed that the kinetic

solution was only a beginning of the process. This process ended with creating a new,

democratic country which was friendly to its former foe. It was significant in cases of

Japan and Germany that the Allies had planned what to do after hostilities, even though

69

not all of the Allies shared the same point of view. The U.S. government was able to enforce an effective policy, which involved a process of democratization in conjunction with economic development, security and the rule of law. This policy was crucial for building a new order in the world and set the conditions for similar operations in the future.

Knowing what defeat meant and what were the objectives of the winner, the author tried to find out if acceptance of defeat was a necessary requirement to achieve victory. In other words, could the winner shape the defeated nation without their acknowledgment of defeat? It was almost impossible to determine the answer with certainty. According to the cases which were studied in this thesis it seems that the answer is that acceptance of defeat is required for the achievement victory. Unconditional surrender meant that the occupied nations were defeated and did not try to resist the occupiers. The other important thing was that convincing the leadership of a country of defeat seemed to be the first step to victory. It was always better to impose changes through their own people than by someone from outside. This was also one of the prerequisites for a successful fight with counterinsurgency, according to the former French officer who fought in Algeria David Galula.[1] Having the leadership of a defeated country on the occupier's side made the job easier because nation was more willing to cooperate. The cooperation was most required during the democratization process. It did not matter if the country had a past experience with this type of government or not, or if it was part of Western Civilization or not. The main factor seemed to be the acceptance of defeat and the effort of the occupiers to enforce its will.

For future and current operations, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, the results of this research are not very optimistic. In both of these countries the nation was not defeated. For example, in Iraq the coalition of the willing defeated Saddam Hussein and his party, but there was no surrender treaty signed by representatives of the legitimate government. In conjunction with the hostile influence from abroad, this created conditions that helped to start the resistance. The situation in Iraq is very complex. The Sunni part of the nation is becoming more and more hostile. The number of people killed is not reducing, and the enemy is still strong and not defeated. Worse yet, the enemy leadership seems too be untouchable. The Shiite majority is not on the winning side, because U.S. policy says they have to accept the Sunni minority and give them equal rights. The Shiite are not willing to do this and they have no obligation to accept U.S. policy because they think they are the winners not the losers.

<div align="center">Interpretation of Chapter 5 Findings</div>

In general in all cases examined acceptance of defeat seemed to be the main factor which allowed for the reshaping defeated nation. What happens if the nation did not feel defeated, as in case of Iraq? There should be some ways of convincing them to accept defeat without the kinetic solution. From the case studies analyzed during this research it was not clear. Germany and Japan after World War II accepted defeat and that was proven in Chapter 4. In Iraq and Afghanistan resistance is still strong and affects the outcome of the occupation. Both cases are also too fresh to be assessed adequately, since it has been less than five years. What is main difference in both cases is that not everyone in the nation was at war. Compartmentalization of the societies before the conflict could be the main difficulty in imposing new reforms. In Japan and Germany there was, in

general, one entity which had to be convinced to accept defeat. Today it is not so easy.

Parts of the societies in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were the winners of the war, do not

want to accept some changes which may affect their society. That is why it is so

important to find a way of convincing them to accept defeat without involving a kinetic

option.

There are different options available, which could be divided into three main

categories: economic support, democratization process, and information control. In non-

kinetic options, information control was crucial in the German and Japanese occupations.

Control of the media and releasing only the information which supported the objectives

of the occupiers was crucial. This allowed the democracy in the initial phase to be

influenced. The process of democratization and economic development was also

important, but the information made a real difference. In the information age, it is very

hard to control the information as it was done after World War II. The Internet, multiple

TV stations and the different points of view presented in the media make the information

war very difficult. The author's point is that if there is an enemy information influence

through the media there will always be somebody willing to fight against the occupiers.

In each society, the majority of the people make judgments based on their emotions,

rather than their intellect.

Recommendations

Socrates said, *Oida ouden eidos* "I know that I know nothing." During this study

the author tried to answer a couple questions, most of which there was no easy answer. In

the process, new questions emerged. Other researchers might interpret these examined

cases differently and the subject certainly requires further analysis.

To improve this study it would help to analyze and compare more cases. One of the most interesting would be research on Poland during the partition in the eighteen century. Even though it was a long time ago, the value of this study would be in assessing the policies of the different occupiers on the same nation. A similar case would be the comparison of West and East Germany after World War II.

Summary and Conclusions

The problem of acceptance of defeat exists and must be solved. This is, in opinion of the author, key to influencing defeated nations. Also, this is required to impose fundamental changes on these societies. These fundamental changes require a change of culture and sometimes even religion, as in case of Japan. If someone wants to be a dominant power in the world they must force their will. If they refuse to do that, their enemies will destroy them, because their enemies would consider that a sign of weakness. Cultural awareness is important but it must be understood as respect for the other people regardless of their faith or culture. It should not mean that the winner is not going to change their culture, which is unavoidable. Culture should be changed because long term peaceful relations require it. Of course there is a limit to how many changes are possible. Even though Japanese culture changed they were still able to retain their national essence. Acceptance of defeat pushed the limits of change but occupiers understood that there was a point beyond which they could not advance.

---

[1]David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 63-80.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Andreopoulos, George J., and Harold E. Selesky. *The Aftermath of Defeat*. Chelsea, Michigan: BookCrafters, Inc., 1994.

Boehling, Rebecca L. *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany*. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996.

von Clausevitz, Carl. *On War*. Michael Howard, and Peter Paret trans. Princeton: Princeton University press, 1976.

Department of the Army. FM 3-90, *Tactics*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001.

De Toy, Brian M. *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign*. Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.

Friedrich, Carl J. *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*. New York, NY: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005.

Ikle, Fred Charles. *Every War Must End*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005.

Jones, Seth G. *Establishing Law and Order after the Conflict*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations*. New York, NY: Knopf, 1985.

Paret, Peter. *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Peters, Ralph. *New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy*. New York, NY: Sentinel, 2005.

Sebald, William J. *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*.
    New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1965.

Spanier, John. *Games Nations Play*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press,
    1986.

U.S. Department of State. *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress*. Washington, DC:
    U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

<div align="center">Articles and Periodicals</div>

Cavaleri, David P., Lt. Col. "Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between
    Combat Operations and Stability Operations." Global War on Terrorism,
    Occasional Paper 7. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

Gott, Kendall D. "Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in
    Germany, 1946-1953." Global War on Terrorism, Occasional Paper 11. Ft.
    Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

Key, Lawrence E. "Cultivating National Will." Maxwell Paper No. 5. Maxwell Air Force
    Base, AL: Air War College, 1996.

<div align="center">Electronic Documents</div>

Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook*. Database on-line. Available from
    http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html. Internet. Accessed 20
    March 2006.

Chiarelli, Peter W., Maj. Gen., US Army, and Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis. "US Army,
    Winning the Peace the Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations." *The U.S.
    Army Professional Writing Collection*. 1 October 2005. Journal on-line. Available
    from http://www.army.mil/proffesionalwriting/volumes/volume3/october_2005
    /10_05_2pf.html. Internet. Accessed 12 February 2006.

The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
    Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002. Document on-line.
    Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. Internet. Accessed 12
    December 2005.

Dobbins, James. "Nation Building: UN Surpasses U.S. on Learning Curve." RAND
    Review. Article on-line. Available from http://www.rand.org/publications/
    randreview/issues/spring2005/nation.html. Internet. Accessed 14 December 2005.

Lawson, Chappel. "Iraq: Democracy? In Iraq?" Hoover Digest, 2003. Article on-line.
    Available from http://www.hooverdigest.org/033/lawson.html#table. Internet.
    Accessed 12 November 2005.

Passos, John D. "Americans Are Loosing the Victory in Europe." *Life Magazine 7*. January 1946, 22-24. Article on-line. Available from http://www.jessicaswell.com /MT/archives/000872.html. Internet. accessed 20 March 2006.

Tures, John A. "Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations." Article on-line. Available from http://diplomacy.shu.edu/journal/new/pdf/VolVINo1/09_Tures.pdf. Internet. Accessed 12 January 2006.

Ziemke, Earl F. *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*. Army Historical Series. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975. Book on-line. Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/other/us-army_germany_1944-46_index.htm. Internet. Accessed 21 January 2006.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Alexander M. Bielakowski
DMH
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. Brian R. Voorhees
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. Scott Porter
CTAC
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. <u>Certification Date</u>: 16 June 2006

2. <u>Thesis Author</u>: CPT Tomasz P. Garbarczyk

3. <u>Thesis Title</u>: Defining Victory in the Aftermath of Successful Campaign: Convincing the Enemy to Accept Defeat

4. <u>Thesis Committee Members</u>: _____

 <u>Signatures</u>: _____

_____

5. <u>Distribution Statement</u>: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B   C   D   E   F   X   SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. <u>Justification</u>: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
<u>Direct Military Support (10)</u>	/	Chapter 3	/	12
<u>Critical Technology (3)</u>	/	Section 4	/	31
<u>Administrative Operational Use (7)</u>	/	Chapter 2	/	13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>   /   <u>Chapter/Section</u>   /   <u>Page(s)</u>

_____   /   _____   /   _____
_____   /   _____   /   _____
_____   /   _____   /   _____
_____   /   _____   /   _____
_____   /   _____   /   _____

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: _____

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

      1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.

      2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

      3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

      4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

      5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

      6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

      7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

      8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

      9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

      10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).